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Governance by Contract: The 
Implications for Corporate Bylaws 
Jill E. Fisch* 
ABSTRACT 
Boards and shareholders are increasingly using charter and 
bylaw provisions to customize their corporate governance. Recent 
examples include forum selection bylaws, majority voting bylaws, and 
advance notice bylaws. Relying on the contractual conception of the 
corporation, Delaware courts have accorded substantial deference to 
board-adopted bylaw provisions, even those that limit shareholder 
rights. 
This Article challenges the rationale for deference under the 
contractual approach. With respect to corporate bylaws, the Article 
demonstrates that, under Delaware law, shareholders’ power to adopt 
and amend bylaws is more limited than the board’s power to do so. As 
a result, shareholders cannot effectively constrain the board’s 
adoption of bylaws with which they disagree. The resulting power 
imbalance offers reasons to question the scope of the contract 
paradigm. 
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This analysis suggests two alternative solutions. One possibility 
is for the Delaware courts and legislature to reconsider existing 
constraints on shareholder power in order to level the playing field 
between shareholders and directors and fully realize the contractual 
paradigm. This approach, which would increase shareholder power, 
has important normative implications. Alternatively, if Delaware law 
retains the existing limitations on shareholder power, this Article 
suggests that judicial reliance on the contract metaphor would be 
misguided and that courts should scrutinize board-adopted bylaws 
more closely. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The contractual approach to corporate law has its roots in the work of 
leading economists such as Ronald Coase1 and Oliver Hart.2 Although scholars 
widely accept the utility of the contract metaphor, they debate its implications 
for regulatory policy.3 Some argue that contract principles support substantial 
deference to the structural arrangements chosen by corporate participants;4 
 
 1. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: 
ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 48, 56 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 
1993) (“[T]he firm is essentially a choice of contractual arrangements.”). 
 2. Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1757 (1989). 
 3. See, e.g., William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under 
Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1563 (1982) (arguing that “[t]he modern business organization can best 
be understood as a series of bargains made under constraints,” but describing this position as positive 
rather than normative). 
 4. E.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991). 
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others question the appropriate scope of this deference.5 Hart, for example, 
observed that governance contracts involving the allocation of rights between 
shareholders and managers are particularly likely to be incomplete within public 
corporations.6 
The contractual approach has become particularly influential in supporting 
deference to the participants’ agreed-upon governance terms on both autonomy 
and efficiency grounds.7 Commentators have argued that corporate law should 
adopt an enabling approach in which default corporate law rules can be freely 
modified by firm participants rather than imposing one-size-fits-all mandatory 
regulations.8 Increasingly, corporate participants are using private ordering to 
customize their corporate governance by adopting issuer-specific terms.9 I have 
described this trend as the “New Governance.”10 Recent examples include forum 
selection bylaws, majority voting bylaws, and advance notice bylaws.11 
Then-Chancellor (now Chief Justice) Strine built upon this well-developed 
contractual model of the corporation in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund 
v. Chevron Corp.12 As Strine explained in Boilermakers, “the bylaws of a 
Delaware corporation constitute part of a binding broader contract among the 
directors, officers, and stockholders formed within the statutory framework of 
the DGCL.”13 In so reasoning, Strine was building upon a judicial tradition 
 
 5. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The 
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989). 
 6. Oliver D. Hart, Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications, 105 ECON. J. 678, 
690 (1995). 
 7. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1416, 1446 (1989) (“The role of corporate law here, as elsewhere, is to adopt a background term 
that prevails unless varied by contract.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Sec. Exch. Comm’r, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt the 
Final Rule Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Nominations (“Proxy Access”) (Aug. 25, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510tap.htm [https://perma.cc/S4V9-VPN6] (“[T]he 
enabling approach defers to private ordering to determine how each firm should be organized to advance 
its particular needs and interests most effectively.”). Other forms of business entity law are more explicit 
in providing the maximum effect to the participants’ agreed-upon terms. See Paul M. Altman & Srinivas 
M. Raju, Delaware Alternative Entities and the Implied Contractual Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing Under Delaware Law, 60 BUS. LAW. 1469, 1469 (2005) (explaining that the Delaware Revised 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act and Limited Liability Company (LLC) Act are “based upon and reflect 
a strong policy favoring broad freedom of contract in connection with almost all aspects of the formation, 
operation and termination of Delaware limited partnerships and limited liability companies”); see also 
Larry E. Ribstein, Unlimited Contracting in the Delaware Limited Partnership and Its Implications for 
Corporate Law, 16 J. CORP. L. 299, 300 (1991) (arguing that the contractual approach reflected in 
Delaware’s LLP statute should be extended to corporations). 
 9. D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with 
Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125 (2011). 
 10. Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1637 (2016). 
 11. See id. at 1654 (describing advance notice and forum selection bylaws); Stephen Choi, Jill 
Fisch, Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1145 (2016) (describing majority voting bylaws). 
 12. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 13. Id. at 939. 
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embracing the academic model of analyzing the power relationship among 
corporate constituencies in contractual terms.14 
Strine’s contractual model of the corporation, as articulated in 
Boilermakers, relied on two factors. The first was a theory of implied consent.15 
Shareholders implicitly consent to be bound by board-adopted bylaws when they 
buy stock in a corporation with a charter that confers that power on the board of 
directors. The second was the shareholders’ right to challenge board-adopted 
bylaws, including “the indefeasible right of the stockholders to adopt and amend 
bylaws themselves.”16 Strine described the shareholders’ ability to do so as 
“legally sacrosanct.”17 
In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, the court again relied on this 
rationale to uphold a board-adopted bylaw that required a losing plaintiff-
shareholder to pay the corporation’s litigation expenses.18 The court’s reasoning 
was not merely based on a contract analogy but rather specifically treated the 
bylaw in question as a contract term, explaining that the bylaw was the 
equivalent of a “contractual exception to the American Rule.”19 Somewhat 
ironically, the court based its conclusion on the fact that corporate bylaws are 
“contracts among a corporation’s shareholders,” despite the fact that the bylaw 
in question had been adopted by the board and had not been subjected to a 
shareholder vote.20 
The broad conception of the shareholders’ bylaw power reflected in both 
Boilermakers and ATP is in tension with an earlier Delaware Supreme Court 
decision. In CA Inc. v. AFSCME, the court held that a shareholder-adopted proxy 
expense reimbursement bylaw was inconsistent with Delaware law because the 
shareholders had limited authority to adopt this type of bylaw.21 Specifically, the 
court concluded that the board’s statutory authority to manage the corporation 
operated as a constraint on shareholder power. As the court explained, “[T]he 
internal governance contract—which here takes the form of a bylaw—is one that 
would also prevent the directors from exercising their full managerial power in 
circumstances where their fiduciary duties would otherwise require them to deny 
reimbursement to a dissident slate.”22 
The tension between Boilermakers/ATP and AFSCME poses a challenge to 
the contemporary understanding that the contractual nature of the corporate form 
 
 14. See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prod. & Chem., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010) (citing 
Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990)) (describing bylaws as 
“contracts among a corporation’s shareholders”). 
 15. Boilermakers, 73 A.2d at 955–56. 
 16. Id. at 956. 
 17. Id. 
 18. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557 (Del. 2014). 
 19. Id. at 558. 
 20. Id. Concededly, ATP was a non-stock corporation, but the court did not limit its holding to 
non-stock corporations. 
 21. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). 
 22. Id. at 239. 
2018] GOVERNANCE BY CONTRACT 377 
warrants the high level of judicial deference to private ordering reflected in 
Boilermakers. Within the context of the New Governance, the board’s power to 
adopt and amend bylaw provisions may, for a variety of reasons, be greater than 
the shareholders’ corresponding power to do so. In turn, the resulting limit on 
the scope of the contract metaphor offers a reason to question the current judicial 
approach to litigation bylaws. 
The implications are twofold. First, a commitment to a contractual 
paradigm suggests that the Delaware courts and possibly the legislature may 
want to reconsider the existing constraints on shareholder power in the name of 
facilitating private ordering. In so doing, they will have to consider the possible 
consequences of greater shareholder empowerment.23 Second, to the extent that 
Delaware law retains the existing limitations on shareholder power reflected in 
AFSCME, the courts should engage in greater scrutiny of board-adopted bylaws 
because shareholders may be unable to remove those bylaws themselves.24 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, the Article briefly sketches the 
foundation for the contractual model of the corporation and the model’s 
application to issuer-specific bylaws. Part II identifies constraints on shareholder 
power to adopt and amend bylaws that create a disparity between the board’s 
power and that of the shareholders. Part III considers the implications of this 
disparity for the contractual approach. 
I. 
THE CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF CORPORATE BYLAWS 
The contractual model of the corporation emphasizes that the relationship 
between managers and shareholders is contractual in nature. This means that the 
governing documents of the corporation—the charter and bylaws—operate and 
bind both managers and shareholders as if they had negotiated their terms and 
signed them, like a common law contract.25 Originating from a strand of law and 
 
 23. These consequences include the increased potential for shareholder activism and the 
consequences of that activism. Commentators have disagreed about the normative implications of 
shareholder empowerment. Compare William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Case Against 
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 658–59 (2010) (arguing that increased shareholder 
empowerment caused managers to manage to the market excessively), with Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The 
Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 836 (2005) (claiming that 
“[i]ncreasing shareholder power to intervene . . . would improve corporate governance and enhance 
shareholder value by addressing important agency problems that have long afflicted publicly traded 
companies”). 
 24. The balance of authority between shareholders and directors to adopt governance bylaws 
has further implications for the scope of permissible shareholder proposals under SEC Rules 14a-8(i)(1) 
and (2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(1) & (2) (2016). Consideration of those implications is beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
 25. See, e.g., Jason W. Neyers, Canadian Corporate Law, Veil-Piercing, and the Private Law 
Model Corporation, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 173, 214 (2000) (questioning whether the “English model [of 
the corporation] is contractual”). 
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economics scholarship, 26 the model has led some law and economics scholars to 
argue that market discipline, imposed through stock prices, would lead to the 
adoption of optimal contract terms for shareholders or, at least, better terms than 
those imposed by regulation.27 
The contractual theory has had important implications for corporate law.28 
Scholars have used it to argue that corporate law should facilitate the contracting 
process by accepting a wide range of firm-specific, customized contract terms.29 
In addition, they have reasoned that corporate law should not mandate a one-
size-fits-all approach, both because it is unlikely that policymakers would 
successfully identify the optimal corporate law rules and because it is unlikely 
that a single rule would be optimal for all issuers.30 
The development of firm-specific governance terms has come to be known 
as private ordering.31 Although a variety of scholars have identified limitations 
to the contractual approach and, as a result, questioned its use as a basis for 
limiting mandatory regulation,32 the approach nonetheless provides the 
normative basis for private ordering.33 Corporate bylaws offer a mechanism by 
which shareholders (and directors) can engage in this private ordering.34 
 
 26. See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate 
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1705 (1989) (observing that the “contractual theory of the 
firm . . . dominate[d] the thinking of most economists and most economically oriented corporate law 
scholars”); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (describing the firm as a “nexus 
for contacting relationships”). 
 27. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 1430–33. 
 28. See generally Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1395 (1989) (discussing implications of the contractual approach for the role of mandatory corporate 
law). 
 29. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 5. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel are 
among the most influential adherents to the contractual model. See Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The 
Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391, 1419 (1992) 
(“Easterbrook and Fischel are worthy heirs to the contractual tradition begun by Coase more than fifty 
years ago.”). 
 30. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to 
the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990) (summarizing the debate over private ordering 
versus mandatory rules). 
 31. Smith et al., supra note 9, at 127 n.12 (discussing various uses of the term “private 
ordering”). 
 32. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1253, 1275 (1999) (arguing against the application of a contractual approach to the duty of loyalty); 
Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 
779, 784 (2006) (“The contractarian theory has turned out to be based largely on an entirely plausible, 
but in fact imaginary, world of contracting.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 
435 (2012) (arguing that federal securities laws should facilitate experimentation with proxy access 
through private ordering). 
 34. See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 9, at 130 (“We would promote private ordering in public 
corporations by lowering the barriers to contracting through the adoption of shareholder bylaws.”). 
Firms can also engage in private ordering by the adoption of firm-specific charter provisions. The critical 
distinction between the charter and the bylaws is that charter amendments typically require both 
shareholder and board approval. In contrast, most states allow boards and shareholders to amend the 
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By virtue of its largely enabling structure, Delaware corporate law is 
consistent with the private ordering approach.35 The Delaware statute contains 
relatively few mandatory provisions.36 Instead, most of the statute provides 
default rules that can be modified through an appropriate charter or bylaw 
provision.37 For example, the statute contains an antitakeover provision 
restricting business combinations with an interested shareholder for a period of 
three years but provides a variety of mechanisms by which a corporation can 
elect to avoid the application of that provision.38 Similarly, the statute provides 
that the board of directors will be elected annually but allows a corporation to 
opt instead for a classified board through a charter provision or shareholder-
adopted bylaw.39 
In addition to enabling individual corporations to modify the statutory 
default rules, the Delaware statute facilitates private ordering by allowing 
corporations to customize their charters and bylaws by including a variety of 
optional contract-like terms. One of the better known provisions, DGCL 
102(b)(7), allows corporations to adopt a charter provision that limits or 
eliminates certain director liability for monetary damages in duty-of-care 
claims.40 Another provision authorizes corporations to adopt a charter provision 
renouncing an interest in specified business opportunities, thereby limiting 
potential claims under the corporate opportunity doctrine.41 The statute also 
authorizes corporations to adopt supermajority voting requirements through the 
inclusion of an optional charter provision.42 
Delaware law allows corporations to use bylaws to similar effect. Under 
the Delaware statute, shareholders have the power to adopt, amend, and repeal 
bylaws. The corporation can grant directors that same power through a charter 
provision, but such a provision cannot remove that power from the 
 
bylaws unilaterally. The requirement of joint action means that the contractual approach has different 
implications for the legitimacy of charter provisions, an issue that is beyond the scope of this Article. In 
addition, statutes may impose different limits on the scope of permissible private ordering that can be 
effected pursuant to a charter provision. See, e.g., Frechter v. Zier, No. 12038, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
214, at *5 n.19 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2017) (contrasting permissible supermajority requirements under 
section 109 with section 102(b)(4)). 
 35. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of 
Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731 (2013). 
 36. Fisch, supra note 10, at 1671. 
 37. For exceptions see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2017) (requiring an annual meeting of 
shareholders); id. § 170 (restricting payment of dividends). 
 38. Id. § 203(a). 
 39. Id. §141(d). 
 40. John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of Directors to Assert § 
102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack 
of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 113 (2004) (describing 
history and scope of 102(b)(7)). Concededly, the section is not fully contractual in that it exempts four 
categories of conduct for which directors cannot be exculpated. Id. at 113–14. 
 41. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2017). 
 42. Id. § 102(b)(4). 
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shareholders.43 The vast majority of Delaware corporate charters vest the board 
of directors with this authority.44 
The scope of potential governance bylaws is very broad. The Delaware 
statute authorizes corporations to adopt “any provision, not inconsistent with law 
or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, 
the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its 
stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”45 Because of this broad scope 
and because shareholders and boards can each adopt governance bylaws 
unilaterally, a substantial amount of private ordering in Delaware corporations 
takes place through the adoption of issuer-specific bylaws.46 
In turn, Delaware courts have largely accepted the contractual theory of 
corporate law.47 As the Delaware Supreme Court explained in Airgas, 
“Corporate charters and bylaws are contracts among a corporation’s 
shareholders.”48 The contractual theory provides courts with a methodology for 
interpreting the charter and bylaws—they are interpreted using contract 
principles.49 The theory also provides courts with a basis for enforcement. As 
Strine explained in Boilermakers, “[T]he bylaws constitute a binding part of the 
contract between a Delaware corporation and its stockholders.”50 
In Boilermakers, the court upheld a board-adopted forum selection bylaw 
as valid, relying on two different factors. The first was a theory of implied 
consent. Strine reasoned that the Delaware statute contemplates that directors 
will, if the charter so provides, have the authority to adopt bylaws unilaterally. 
Given the statutory framework, if a corporation’s charter authorizes the board to 
amend the bylaws, its shareholders implicitly agree that they “will be bound by 
bylaws adopted unilaterally by their boards.”51 Shareholders consent by deciding 
to invest in the corporation.52 
Second, Strine found support for the contractual analysis in light of the 
shareholders’ statutory rights when they disagree with a board-adopted bylaw. 
As Strine noted, the shareholders possess their own right, comparable to that of 
the board, to adopt or amend bylaws.53 Additionally, shareholders have the 
 
 43. Id. § 109(a). 
 44. Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate 
Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 589 n.25 (2016) (“Universally, publicly traded corporations 
grant directors such powers from their inception.”). 
 45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2017). 
 46. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, The Shareholder Franchise Is Not a Myth: A Response to 
Professor Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 811, 821 (2007) (explaining that shareholders can engage in private 
ordering by adopting bylaws that modify an issuer’s procedures for electing directors, including the 
implementation of majority voting). 
 47. See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 955 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 51. Id. at 956. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (citing CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 (Del. 2008)). 
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power to discipline boards that refuse to accede to a shareholder vote concerning 
a bylaw by removing recalcitrant directors from their positions. Strine therefore 
concluded that “a corporation’s bylaws are part of an inherently flexible contract 
between the stockholders and the corporation under which the stockholders have 
powerful rights they can use to protect themselves if they do not want board-
adopted forum selection bylaws to be part of the contract between themselves 
and the corporation.”54 
The Boilermakers decision reflected a powerful endorsement of contractual 
freedom in corporate law. As such, it encouraged corporations to engage in 
private ordering through the adoption and amendment of corporate bylaws.55 
Corporations responded to this invitation. For example, issuer adoption of forum 
selection bylaws, which had been used to a limited extent prior to the 
Boilermakers decision, “rapidly accelerated” after Boilermakers.56 
Issuers also began to experiment with other governance bylaws.57 In ATP, 
the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a board-adopted fee-shifting bylaw, 
reasoning that the contractual analysis in Boilermakers was applicable.58 
Likewise, a number of issuers adopted director qualification bylaws to prohibit 
certain types of compensation agreements for activist-nominated director 
candidates.59 A few issuers even adopted bylaws compelling arbitration.60  
 
 54. Id. at 957. 
 55. Issuers had previously adopted various types of governance bylaws. For example, advance 
notice bylaws, which require a shareholder to provide the issuer with advance notice of the intention to 
nominate competing director candidates, were prevalent prior to the Boilermakers decision. See 
WilmerHale, 2015 M&A Report 5 (2015), 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/2015-
WilmerHale-MA-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR3U-MVZK] (estimating that “95 percent of the S&P 
500 and 90 percent of the Russell 3000 had advance notice provisions at 2014 year-end”). Delaware law 
imposes a high standard for enjoining advance notice bylaws. See, e.g., Gibson Dunn, Advance Notice 
Bylaws: Trends and Challenges 2 (2015), https://www.gibsondunn.com/advance-notice-bylaws-trends-
and-challenges [https://perma.cc/55EC-KWHQ] (explaining that the court’s decision in AB Value 
Partners “clarifies that under Delaware law, advance notice bylaws will only be enjoined in cases that 
pass the relatively high bar of ‘inequitable circumstances’”). 
 56. Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum 
Shareholder Litigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 38 (2017). The Delaware legislature 
explicitly endorsed the validity of forum selection bylaws in 2015. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 
109(b) (West 2015). 
 57. See generally Fisch, supra note 10 (describing range of board-adopted governance bylaws). 
 58. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014). The Delaware 
legislature subsequently amended the statute to prohibit fee-shifting bylaws. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 
102(f), 109(b) (West 2015). 
 59. See Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, How 
Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 652–53 (2016). 
Notably, the golden leash bylaw experience was consistent with Strine’s reasoning in Boilermakers. 
When shareholders objected to the bylaws by withholding their votes from directors who adopted them, 
the offending board responded by repealing the provisions. Id. 
 60. See Claudia Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?, 39 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 751 (2014). Several courts upheld the decision to adopt an arbitration bylaw by one issuer, a 
Massachusetts REIT, although the analysis did not implicate Delaware corporate law. Del. Cnty. Emps. 
Ret. Fund v. Portnoy, No. 13-10405, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40107 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014) (applying 
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Commentators argued that the validity of such bylaws followed from the 
reasoning in ATP and Boilermakers.61 
Shareholders also increased their efforts to engage in private ordering 
through the adoption of governance bylaws. In recent years, shareholders have 
proposed a variety of governance reforms through bylaw amendments, including 
majority voting, proxy access, and the right of shareholders to call a special 
meeting. These proposals have enjoyed considerable voting support. As of 
January 2014, for example, “almost 90 percent of S&P 500 companies ha[d] 
adopted some form of majority voting.”62 The year 2015 was a “break-through 
year” for proxy access shareholder bylaws, due in part to a shareholder proposal 
campaign by the New York City Comptroller.63 Most proxy access proposals 
received support by a majority of shareholders, and a growing number of issuers 
are adopting some form of proxy access.64 
II. 
LIMITS OF THE CONTRACT ANALOGY: POWER ASYMMETRY BETWEEN THE 
BOARD AND SHAREHOLDERS 
As noted above, boards and shareholders are using private ordering to adopt 
issuer-specific governance bylaws. If these bylaws are properly understood as 
negotiated terms of a contract, arguably courts should give them broad deference. 
The Boilermakers and ATP decisions relied on this rationale to uphold forum 
selection and fee-shifting bylaws, respectively. 
There are two critical problems, however, with the contractual analysis. 
One problem is the question of whether shareholders truly should be understood 
to consent to the terms of the charter and bylaws as Strine reasoned. The issue of 
consent is an important one, but it is beyond the scope of this Article.65 The 
 
res judicata to deny plaintiff’s motion for a declaratory judgment); Katz v. CommonWealth REIT, No. 
24-C-13-001299 (Md. Cir. Ct. Aug. 31, 2015) (citing contractual analysis of the Boilermakers decision); 
Corvex Mgmt. LP v. CommonWealth REIT, No. 24-C-13-001111, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3 (Md. 
Cir. Ct. May 8, 2013) (denying motion to stay arbitration on the basis that the plaintiffs had assented to 
arbitration where the shares bore a legend providing constructive notice and the plaintiffs were 
sophisticated investors). 
 61. See Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors, to Keith F. 
Higgins, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, and John Ramsey, Acting Dir., Div. of Trading and Mkts., SEC 
(Dec. 11, 2013) (reasoning that decisions like Boilermakers could lead corporations to adopt arbitration 
bylaws). 
 62. Choi et al., supra note 11, at 1121. 
 63. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT, PROXY ACCESS PROPOSALS 1 (2015), 
http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/memos/firmmemo_07_30_15_proxy-access-
proposals.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TZV-HZWD]. 
 64. WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, WHAT’S NEW FOR THE 2016 PROXY SEASON: ENGAGEMENT, 
TRANSPARENCY, PROXY ACCESS AND MORE 7 (2016), 
https://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/1_22_16_governance-alert_final2.pdf?cid=8590500125 
[https://perma.cc/4J78-U338] (reporting that 124 issuers adopted proxy access between Jan. 1, 2015, 
and Feb. 4, 2016, either voluntarily or in response to a shareholder proposal). 
 65. For further discussion of this point, see Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 
96 B.U. L. REV. 485, 496 (2016). 
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second problem, which this Article addresses, is that for a variety of reasons 
shareholder power to amend the bylaws is more limited than the Boilermakers 
decision suggests. Although the board has broad power to adopt governance 
bylaws, shareholders do not enjoy analogous power. Accordingly, shareholders 
are limited in their ability to constrain board actions with which they disagree. 
This Part identifies several key limitations on shareholder power over the 
corporation’s bylaws. The following Part considers the implications of these 
limitations. 
A. Substantive Limits on Shareholder Power Under Section 109 
Although Boilermakers and ATP describe shareholder power to adopt and 
amend bylaws under Delaware law as very broad, an earlier Delaware Supreme 
Court decision, CA, Inc. v. AFSCME, suggests a more limited shareholder role.66 
AFSCME, a union pension fund, submitted a shareholder proposal to amend the 
bylaws pursuant to Rule 14a-8.67 The proposed bylaw required the issuer, under 
certain circumstances, to reimburse reasonable proxy solicitation expenses 
incurred by a stockholder who nominated one or more candidates for election to 
the board of directors.68 CA sought to exclude the shareholder proposal from its 
proxy statement on the basis that the proposed bylaw was not a proper subject 
for shareholder action and, if adopted, would be illegal under DGCL section 
141(a).69 
In support of its request for no-action relief, CA submitted to the SEC an 
opinion letter from Delaware counsel, arguing that the proposed bylaw was 
invalid because it would interfere with the board’s authority under the statute and 
the charter to manage the corporation.70 According to the letter, the board, not 
the shareholders, had the discretion to determine how to expend corporate funds, 
and the shareholders lacked the authority “unilaterally [to impose] limits on the 
Board’s discretion.”71 The letter also argued that the bylaw would “impede the 
Board’s exercise of its fiduciary duties to manage the business and affairs of the 
Company.”72 
 
 66. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 229 (Del. 2008). Prior to 
AFSCME, the position of the Delaware courts on this issue was less clear. See Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC 
Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985) (upholding shareholder-adopted bylaw amendments that 
“required attendance of all directors for a quorum and unanimous approval of the board of directors 
before board action can be taken . . . thereby limit[ing] the functioning of the Frantz board” even though 
the amendments were intended to limit the board’s “anti-takeover maneuvering”). 
 67. AFSCME, 953 A.2d at 229; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2016). 
 68. AFSCME, 953 A.2d at 229–30. 
 69. No-Action Request from Richards, Layton & Finger, Counsel for CA, Inc., to SEC, Div. of 
Corp. Fin. (Apr. 17, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2008/ca062708-14a8-
incoming.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9SJ-5Q49]. 
 70. Id. at 3–4. 
 71. Id. at 7 n.3. 
 72. Id. 
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The SEC sought guidance from the Delaware Supreme Court as to whether 
CA’s argument was correct as a matter of Delaware corporate law.73 CA used 
Delaware’s newly adopted certification procedure74 to certify two questions to 
the Delaware Supreme Court: 
1. Is the AFSCME Proposal a proper subject for action by 
shareholders as a matter of Delaware law? 
2. Would the AFSCME Proposal, if adopted, cause CA to violate 
any Delaware law to which it is subject?75 
In its decision, the court provided several guiding principles about the scope 
of shareholder authority under section 109. First, and perhaps most importantly, 
the court explicitly rejected the idea that shareholder power to adopt bylaws is 
coextensive with that of the board of directors.76 Instead, the court explained that 
shareholder power is limited by section 141(a), which provides the board, but 
not the shareholders, with broad management power over the affairs of the 
corporation.77 The court explained that a shareholder-adopted bylaw would be 
invalid if it limited “the board’s management prerogatives under Section 
141(a).”78 
In AFSCME, the court offered guidance on the permissible scope of 
shareholder bylaws in order to analyze the relationship between board authority 
under section 141(a) and shareholder power under section 109.79 As a starting 
point, the court recognized that the statutory language was only “marginally 
 
 73. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 231 (Del. 2008).  
 74. S.B. 62, 144th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2007). 
 75. AFSCME, 953 A.2d at 231. 
 76. “[I]n isolation, Section 109(a) could be read to make the board’s and the shareholders’ 
power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws identical and coextensive, but Section 109(a) does not exist in 
a vacuum. It must be read together with 8 Del. C. § 141(a) . . . .” Id. at 232. 
 77. See id. (“No such broad management power is statutorily allocated to the shareholders.”). 
 78. Id. at 232. The court’s analysis drew on an argument that commentators had developed in 
response to pill redemption bylaws. See, e.g., Lawrence Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and 
Stockholder Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409 (1998). In the late 1990s, 
institutional investors attempted to adopt bylaws to restrict a board’s use of a poison pill to resist a hostile 
tender offer. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome 
of Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605, 610–12 (1997) (describing efforts by 
institutional investors to introduce pill redemption bylaws). The Delaware courts did not rule on the 
validity of pill redemption bylaws. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and Utility of the Shareholder 
Rights Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 866 (1998) (“No Delaware court has addressed the legality of 
the shareholder rights bylaw.”). An Oklahoma court, however, upheld a bylaw requiring that the board 
submit a pill to its shareholders for ratification. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., 975 
P.2d 907, 908 (Okla. 1999). Commentators have argued that Delaware law espouses a board-centric 
model of the corporation that is inconsistent with the Fleming decision and defended this model on 
normative grounds. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 572 (2003) (reasoning both that the corporate form 
involves the shareholders’ decision to delegate this control to the board and that this delegation is 
efficient); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 601, 627 (2006) (“[S]hareholder voting must be constrained in order to preserve the value of 
authority.”). 
 79. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232–33 (Del. 2008). 
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helpful in determining what the Delaware legislature intended to be the lawful 
scope of the shareholders’ power to adopt, amend and repeal bylaws.”80 Notably, 
in contrast to the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act and Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act, the Delaware corporate law statute does not contain any 
language explicitly endorsing a contractual approach.81 
The court went on to explain that the proper function of bylaws was to 
address procedural issues rather than to mandate substantive business decisions. 
This substance/procedure distinction could be used to demarcate the permissible 
scope of a shareholder-adopted bylaw under Delaware law.82 Accordingly, the 
court then framed its analysis of the first certified question as requiring it to 
determine whether an expense reimbursement bylaw was “process-related.”83 
The court concluded that it was. Although the bylaw concededly involved the 
expenditure of corporate funds, the court reasoned that the expenditure was 
related to maintaining the integrity of the electoral process. As a result, the bylaw 
was a proper subject for shareholder action. 
The substance/procedure distinction can be understood as a way to 
determine when a shareholder-adopted bylaw impermissibly infringes upon 
board authority under section 141(a).84 Because section 141(a) vests the board 
with authority over substantive business decisions, a substantive bylaw could be 
understood to usurp that authority. A bylaw that addresses the procedure by 
which a decision is made but leaves the ultimate decision to the board, however, 
would presumably be valid.85 The substance/procedure distinction thus creates a 
different scope for board-adopted bylaws than for those adopted by shareholders 
because the board is not limited to process bylaws. 
The AFSCME court’s determination that the proxy reimbursement bylaw 
was process-based, and therefore legally permissible, did not conclude the 
analysis, however. The court went on to consider the second question—whether 
the proposed bylaw would cause CA to violate Delaware law. The court 
concluded that it would. Reasoning that the bylaw could, hypothetically, require 
 
 80. Id. at 234. 
 81. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2011) (“It is the policy of this chapter to give 
the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract . . . .”). 
 82. AFSCME, 953 A.2d at 235 (“[T]here is a general consensus that bylaws that regulate the 
process by which the board acts are statutorily authorized.”). 
 83. Id. at 236. 
 84. Commentators have suggested other approaches to analyzing this question. For example, 
Ben Walther distinguishes between bylaws that attempt to circumscribe the managerial authority of the 
board and those that attempt to control or bind the board. Ben Walther, Bylaw Governance, 20 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 399, 414–15 (2015). Jack Coffee offers four criteria for distinguishing 
proper from improper shareholder bylaws: 1) bylaws that deal with fundamental versus ordinary matters; 
2) bylaws that impose negative constraints as opposed to affirmative obligations; 3) bylaws that focus 
on procedure rather than substance; and 4) bylaws that concern corporate governance rather than 
business decisions. See Coffee, supra note 78, at 613–15. 
 85. See also Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1078–79 (Del. Ch. 2004) (stating that 
there is a “general consensus that bylaws that regulate the process by which the board acts are statutorily 
authorized”). 
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the board to reimburse a stockholder’s proxy expenses in a situation in which 
reimbursement would violate the board’s fiduciary duties, the court held that this 
deficiency rendered the bylaw facially invalid.86 
The court reached this conclusion by analogizing to situations in which 
courts had invalidated contracts that imposed obligations on a board that 
arguably were inconsistent with the board’s fiduciary duties.87 Although those 
situations involved contractual obligations that the board had voluntarily 
assumed, as opposed to obligations imposed by a shareholder-adopted bylaw, 
the court found that “the distinction is one without a difference.”88 The court’s 
rationale was that, in either case, the result would be to limit the board from 
exercising the full scope of its managerial authority.89 Again, the touchstone of 
the analysis was the board’s broad authority under section 141(a).90 
Although the AFSCME decision has been criticized,91 and the Delaware 
legislature subsequently amended the statute to authorize explicitly both proxy 
expense reimbursement bylaws and proxy access bylaws,92 the principle that 
shareholder authority under section 109 is more limited than director authority 
appears to have survived. In a 2015 decision, Vice-Chancellor Noble invalidated 
a bylaw that authorized shareholders to remove and replace corporate officers 
without cause.93 Notably, the plaintiff in that case relied on statutory language 
that seemed expressly to authorize bylaws that dealt with the appointment and 
removal of corporate officers.94 
 
 86. The court explained that it was required to view the bylaw as inconsistent with the law if 
there was “any possible circumstance under which a board of directors might be required to act [where] 
the board of directors would breach their fiduciary duties if they complied with the Bylaw.” CA, Inc. v. 
AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008). 
 87. See id. (citing Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)). 
 88. Id. at 239. 
 89. The extent to which the inclusion of a fiduciary out in the bylaw would address this concern 
is an open issue. See Sabrina Ursaner, Note, Keeping “Fiduciary Outs” Out of Shareholder-Proposed 
Bylaws: An Analysis of CA, Inc. v. AFSCME, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 479, 507–08 (2010). 
 90. Notably, however, the court suggested that the situation might be different if the limitation 
had been imposed through a charter provision rather than a bylaw. See AFSCME, 953 A.2d at 240 
(suggesting that shareholders might have recourse by seeking “to amend the Certificate of Incorporation 
to include the substance of the Bylaw”). Because the scope of charter provisions is similarly limited to 
what is permitted by the statute, it is unclear why using a charter provision instead of a bylaw would 
affect the outcome. The distinction, however, motivated an argument by the plaintiffs in Boilermakers 
that, to the extent that a forum selection provision was permissible, it had to be adopted through a charter 
provision rather than a bylaw. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 
955 n. 93 (Del. Ch. 2013). The court rejected that argument. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Bylaw Reforms for Delaware’s Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 651, 668 (2008). 
 92. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112, 113 (2017). 
 93. Gorman v. Salamone, No. 10183-VCN, 2015 De. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *18–19 (De. Ch. 
July 31, 2015). 
 94. Id. at *13–14. See Paul M. Tiger & Carolyn Oh, Gorman v. Salamone: Delaware Court of 
Chancery Strikes Down Bylaw Granting Stockholders the Right to Remove and Replace Officers, 
CLEARY M&A & CORP. GOVERNANCE WATCH (Aug. 31, 2015), 
http://www.clearymawatch.com/2015/08/gorman-v-salamone-delaware-court-of-chancery-strikes-
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Significantly, Vice-Chancellor Noble relied on the AFSCME decision for 
the proposition that “[s]tockholders’ ability to amend bylaws is ‘not coextensive 
with the board’s concurrent power and is limited by the board’s management 
prerogatives under Section 141(a).’”95 He further held that the touchstone for 
determining whether the bylaw infringed on the board’s management function 
was the substance/procedure distinction developed by the AFSCME court.96 
Applying this standard, he concluded that the bylaw was invalid because it 
“would allow [shareholders] to make substantive business decisions for the 
Company.”97 
B. Additional Statutory Limits on Shareholder Power 
Although AFSCME distinguished between shareholder and board power to 
adopt and amend the bylaws, it is only one case. The extent to which future courts 
will adhere to that distinction remains unclear.98 Still, the structure and language 
of the Delaware corporation statute provide additional reasons to view the scope 
of shareholder power under section 109 as limited.99 One notable feature of the 
statute is that it contains a number of provisions expressly authorizing 
shareholders to vote on bylaws that address particular issues. These provisions 
include authorizing proxy expense reimbursement under section 112, providing 
proxy access under section 113, classifying the board of directors under section 
141(d), requiring majority voting under section 216, and opting out of the state 
antitakeover statute under section 203(b)(3). 
Although the statute does not contain any language indicating that the 
shareholders may only adopt bylaws addressing subjects expressly authorized 
therein, there are two possible reasons to read the list of explicit statutory 
authorizations as limiting the scope of shareholder power. First, if, as section 109 
implies, shareholders may adopt bylaws containing “any provision, not 
inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the 
business of the corporation,”100 the list of subject-specific authorizations would 
 
down-bylaw-granting-stockholders-the-right-to-remove-and-replace-officers [https://perma.cc/68XM-
3M6B] (explaining Gorman decision). Section 142(b) provides: “Officers shall be chosen in such 
manner and shall hold their offices for such terms as are prescribed by the bylaws or determined by the 
board of directors or other governing body.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b) (2017) (emphasis added). 
 95. Gorman, 2015 LEXIS 202, at *11 (quoting CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 
A.2d 227, 232 (Del. 2008)). 
 96. Id. at *1314 (holding that “valid bylaws focus on process”). 
 97. Id. at *6. 
 98. See also Walther, supra note 84, at 448 (arguing that AFSCME’s “influence may be 
dwindling”). 
 99. See also James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 257, 291–92 (2015) (arguing that courts should “divert course from the deceptive nature of the 
nexus-of-contracts approach and return to the corporate statute to divine the relative rights of the board 
vis-à-vis the shareholders”). 
 100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2017). 
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be unnecessary.101 Consequently, under a formalistic approach to statutory 
construction,102 the fact that the statute sets out a litany of subjects upon which a 
shareholder-adopted bylaw is permitted implies that, in the absence of statutory 
authorization, at least some types of shareholder-adopted bylaws are not 
allowed.103 
Second, the enabling provisions reinforce the idea that shareholder 
authority over corporate affairs is limited and that all residual authority is vested 
in the board of directors.104 This perspective is consistent with the argument 
identified in the prior Part that board power to manage the corporation is 
unlimited pursuant to section 141(a), but shareholders possess only those powers 
expressly conferred by the statute. It is also consistent with a statutory structure 
that confers specific and limited powers upon shareholders apart from their 
power to adopt bylaws, vesting all remaining power in the board. For example, 
the Delaware statute authorizes shareholders to vote on specific issues—election 
of the board of directors, amendments to the certificate of incorporation, and 
approval of mergers and other structural changes.105 Thus, the inclusion of 
subject-specific shareholder bylaw authorization provisions and the general 
enabling approach of Delaware corporate law with respect to board power 
suggest that the scope of shareholder power is more limited than that of the 
board. 
An additional reason that shareholder authority under section 109 is limited 
is that, in virtually all corporations, it is nonexclusive.106 Although shareholders 
have the power to adopt and amend the bylaws, so does the board of directors. 
 
 101. Put differently, one could view a bylaw as inconsistent with the statute unless it deals with 
a subject upon which a bylaw is expressly permitted. 
 102. Although Delaware adheres to the equal dignity doctrine, in which actions taken pursuant 
to various statute sections constitute acts of independent legal significance, see Hariton v. Arco 
Electronics, Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963), at least one commentator has noted that the equal dignity 
rule may not be equally applicable to questions of shareholder power. See Larry E. Ribstein, Takeover 
Defenses and the Corporate Contract, 78 GEO. L.J. 71, 117 n.253 (1989) (“Rules limiting directors’ 
powers play a different role in the economic structure of the firm than do rules limiting the power of the 
majority of the shareholders.”). 
 103. See Hamermesh, supra note 78, at 444 (arguing that “as a matter of formal statutory 
construction, then, it is preferable to read section 141(a) as an absolute preclusion against by-law limits 
on director management authority, in the absence of explicit statutory authority for such limits outside 
of section 109(b)”). 
 104. The structure is similar to the federalist system imposed by the U.S. Constitution in which 
Congress has limited authority and all residual power remains with the states. See generally John Yoo, 
The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1393 (1997) (“The Tenth Amendment 
states that ‘the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’”). 
 105. But see Bebchuk, supra note 23 (arguing that the scope of subjects upon which shareholders 
can vote should be expanded). 
 106. See Hamermesh, supra note 78, at 417 n.27 (“This is thus an area in which the statutory 
default rule in states like Delaware, New York, and Oklahoma—denying the directors the power to 
adopt and amend by-laws—is sharply at odds with custom and practice.”). 
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As a result, even if the shareholders adopt a bylaw, their action may be 
overturned by the board.107 
The Delaware statute contains provisions that explicitly protect a 
shareholder-adopted bylaw from board repeal, but they are applicable only to a 
few substantive issues. For example, DGCL section 216 provides that a 
shareholder-adopted bylaw specifying the votes required for the election of 
directors “shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of directors.”108 
Absent language such as that found in section 216, it appears that the board of a 
Delaware corporation is free to amend or repeal a shareholder-adopted bylaw 
with which it disagrees.109 
In contrast, it is unclear under Delaware law whether shareholders can 
prevent the board from overturning a shareholder-adopted bylaw by including 
language to that effect in a proposed bylaw.110 Indeed, the Delaware Supreme 
Court stated in dictum that a shareholder-adopted bylaw that purported to be 
insulated from board override would be void, reasoning that the limitation was 
“in obvious conflict” with the directors’ “general authority to adopt or amend 
corporate by-laws.”111 Relatedly, a Delaware court explicitly upheld a board’s 
decision to repeal a critical bylaw even though the shareholders were about to 
vote to reject the bylaw’s repeal.112 The court reasoned that the shareholders had 
an appropriate remedy available in that they could call a special meeting, vote to 
reinstate the bylaw, and then remove the offending directors.113 
Delaware law differs in this regard from the Model Business Corporation 
Act.114 The Model Act explicitly authorizes shareholders to insulate any 
shareholder-adopted bylaw from board override, providing that “[a] 
corporation’s board of directors may amend or repeal the corporation’s bylaws, 
 
 107. See id. at 416 (“Even if the stockholders could validly initiate and adopt a by-law limiting 
the authority of the directors, such a by-law amendment would accomplish little or nothing if the board 
of directors could simply repeal it after the stockholders adopted it.”). 
 108. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2017). 
 109. Vice-Chancellor Jacobs explicitly referenced the board’s power as a limitation on the 
contractual approach in Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995). As he explained: 
“[A]lthough the by-laws are a contract between the corporation and its stockholders, the contract was 
subject to the board’s power to amend the by-laws unilaterally.” Id. 
 110. See L. John Bird, Comment, Stockholder and Corporate Board Bylaw Battles: Delaware 
Law and the Ability of a Corporate Board to Change or Overrule Stockholder Bylaw Amendments, 11 
U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 217, 219 (2008) (observing that the Delaware statute places “no express limits 
on the application of such director amendment authority to stockholder-adopted by-laws”); see also In 
re Pennzoil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act LEXIS 304, at *1–2, 66 (Feb. 24, 1993) 
(approving, on other grounds, exclusion of a shareholder-proposed bylaw amendment that included 
language barring its repeal without shareholder approval). 
 111. Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 929 (Del. 1990). But see Am. 
Int’l Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Cross, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 413, at *9 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1984) (suggesting in 
dictum that shareholders could amend the bylaws and remove the board’s power to amend the applicable 
provision further). 
 112. Am. Int’l Rent-a-Car, Inc., 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 413, at *9. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Bird, supra note 110, at 219. 
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unless . . . the shareholders in amending, repealing or adopting a bylaw expressly 
provide that the board of directors may not amend, repeal, or reinstate that 
bylaw.”115 As one commentator noted, Delaware could amend its statute to take 
a similar approach, thereby increasing (or explicitly acknowledging) shareholder 
power.116 
On the other hand, a broadly construed board power to amend or repeal 
shareholder-adopted bylaws might provide a solution to the question of 
shareholder authority raised in AFSCME. To the extent that a board retains the 
authority to repeal a shareholder-adopted bylaw that would infringe on its 
managerial authority or cause it to violate its fiduciary duties, arguably that 
power alone should save the bylaw from the infirmity identified in AFSCME. At 
least at issuers for which the board has concurrent authority with the shareholders 
to amend the bylaws, the board’s power to do so would seem to imply that a 
shareholder-adopted bylaw could not infringe on board authority under section 
141(a). 
Then-Vice Chancellor Strine implicitly made this point in dictum in 
General DataComm Industries v. Wisconsin Investment Board.117 In considering 
whether a shareholder-proposed bylaw that prevented the board from repricing 
options without shareholder approval was valid under Delaware law, he observed 
that the board could repeal the offending bylaw at any time if it determined that 
it was necessary to do so.118 Accordingly, he suggested that a bylaw might not 
constrain board discretion in the same way as a poison pill that could not be 
redeemed by a new board majority, which the court had previously rejected.119 
Boards can also block shareholder efforts to insulate a bylaw from board 
repeal by proactively adopting their own bylaw that does not preclude 
subsequent board amendment. Boards at a number of issuers have used this 
approach with respect to majority voting bylaws.120 Currently, under the laws of 
 
 115. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
 116. Bird, supra note 110, at 229 (observing that Delaware “could adopt the relevant provisions 
of the Model Business Corporation Act wholesale, giving shareholders the ability to adopt bylaws that 
cannot be further amended by the board when so stated within the bylaw”). Alternatively, Delaware 
could reinforce its director primacy position by explicitly granting the board the power to amend any 
shareholder-adopted bylaw. See id. (“[T]he legislature could amend existing statutes to give the board 
explicit power to amend or revoke shareholder adopted bylaw amendments.”). 
 117. Gen. DataComm Indus., Inc. v. State of Wis. Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 821 (Del. Ch. 1999) 
(implying that the board had the power to repeal shareholder-adopted bylaws but noting that the law in 
this area was unsettled). 
 118. Id. at 821 (footnotes omitted) (“It may be that GDC is correct in stating that the Repricing 
Bylaw is obviously invalid under the teaching of Quickturn. But the question of whether a stockholder-
approved bylaw that can potentially be repealed at any time by the GDC board of directors exercising 
its business judgment, see 8 Del. C. § 109(a), is clearly invalid under the teaching of a case involving a 
board-approved contractual rights plan precluding, by contract, a new board majority from redeeming 
the rights under the plan until six months after election seems to me to be a question worthy of careful 
consideration.”). 
 119. Id. (suggesting the possibility that the bylaw presented a situation that was distinguishable 
from that in Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998)). 
 120. Mary Siegel, The Holes in Majority Voting, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 364, 374 (2011). 
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many states, including Delaware, a shareholder-adopted majority voting bylaw 
is insulated from board repeal.121 This restriction does not apply, however, to a 
board-adopted majority voting bylaw. As a result, boards can avoid the 
restriction on their power by adopting majority voting bylaws themselves.122 As 
one commentator noted, “In so doing, directors doubly benefit: they not only 
gain approval from shareholders who support majority voting, but the directors 
have also assured themselves the opportunity to repeal, unilaterally, their own 
bylaw.”123 
A related issue is whether shareholders indeed have the power to amend or 
repeal a board-adopted bylaw with which they disagree, as Strine suggested in 
Boilermakers.124 The issue is potentially problematic to the extent that the 
board’s bylaw authority is broader than that of the shareholders, as suggested in 
AFSCME. If a board adopts a bylaw pursuant to its authority under section 141(a) 
that the shareholders could not have adopted on their own, it is not clear that the 
shareholders have the power to amend or repeal that bylaw. In other words, it is 
plausible that AFSCME sets analogous limits on both shareholder power to adopt 
bylaws and their power to amend or repeal board-adopted bylaws.125 Although 
the Delaware courts have not had occasion to address this question, as 
corporations increase their efforts at private ordering and shareholders become 
more willing to challenge board-adopted governance measures, the issue is more 
likely to arise.126 
Shareholders, of course, have other ways of responding to an issuer’s 
governance provisions. In particular, shareholders can discipline boards directly 
by withholding support for directors or, if an issuer has majority voting, by 
removing directors who adopt objectionable bylaws. While these methods have 
been somewhat successful, they are not enough to close the existing gap between 
 
 121. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2017) (“A bylaw amendment adopted by 
stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary for the election of directors shall not be 
further amended or repealed by the board of directors.”). 
 122. Siegel, supra note 120. 
 123. Id. at 374. 
 124. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 958 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(observing that “stockholders retain the right to modify the corporation’s bylaws”). Notably, prior to the 
Boilermakers decision, shareholders at four issuers introduced non-binding proposals seeking to repeal 
a board-adopted forum selection bylaw. Claudia Allen, Exclusive Forum Provisions: Putting on the 
Brakes, CONF. BD. BLOG (Dec. 19, 2012), http://tcbblogs.org/governance/2012/12/19/exclusive-forum-
provisions-putting-on-the-brakes [https://perma.cc/HD4K-VDBQ]. Only two of those proposals went 
to a vote, and neither received the support of a majority of the shareholders. The other two companies 
repealed their respective bylaws prior to a vote. Id. 
 125. Cf. Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (holding 
that, under Georgia corporate law, shareholders could not adopt a bylaw to overturn the “dead-hand” 
provision of a poison pill because the law vested sole authority over the terms of a poison pill in the 
board of directors). 
 126. Relatedly, shareholders have actively sought to overturn corporate charter provisions 
establishing staggered boards, an endeavor aided by the Harvard Shareholder Rights Project. See Fisch, 
supra note 10, at 1647 (describing Shareholder Rights Project). 
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board and shareholder power. In addition, as will be discussed below, they are 
vulnerable to practical problems.127 
One of the most powerful options for shareholders is to withhold voting 
support from director candidates who adopt or fail to repeal an objectionable 
governance provision.128 The effectiveness of this approach has been enhanced 
by the role of the major proxy advisory firms, ISS and Glass Lewis.129 These 
firms have highlighted both unilateral board actions that reduce shareholder 
rights and board failures to respond to shareholder demands,130 labeling them 
critical factors influencing their recommendations with respect to director 
elections.131 In response, shareholders take these recommendations very 
seriously.132 For example, one commentator reported that, of the various reasons 
for ISS issuing a negative recommendation with respect to a director candidate, 
a “lack of ‘responsiveness’” is “clearly the most impactful.”133 
A recent example demonstrates the potential effectiveness of shareholder 
power to withhold votes in director elections. In 2013, ISS published a policy 
position indicating its intention to recommend that shareholders withhold their 
votes from directors who had adopted a director compensation bylaw limiting a 
board candidate’s ability to receive compensation from a third party.134 So-called 
“golden leash” bylaws were developed by the law firm Wachtell Lipton as a 
response to compensation arrangements between activist hedge funds and their 
 
 127. See infra Part II.C.  
 128. Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of Proxy 
Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 660 (2009) (describing “withhold vote” campaigns by shareholders); 
Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Understanding Uncontested Director Elections, MGMT. 
SCI. (forthcoming 2018) (providing empirical analysis of factors driving shareholders to withhold votes 
in uncontested elections). 
 129. See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or 
Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 868 (2010) (finding that while proxy advisors enhance shareholder voting 
power, their influence is often overstated). 
 130. See e.g., WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, HEADS UP FOR 2015 PROXY SEASON: TWO PROXY 
ADVISORY FIRM DEVELOPMENTS (2014), 
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/pcag_alert_nov2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8SF-6LC9] 
(describing ISS and Glass Lewis policies, adopted in 2015, of generally issuing “negative vote 
recommendations against directors if the board amends the bylaws or charter without shareholder 
approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholder rights or otherwise impedes shareholder 
ability to exercise their rights”); Ertimur et al, supra note 128, at 3 (reporting that of ISS board-level 
withhold recommendations, “72.2 percent are due to lack of responsiveness to shareholder proposals 
receiving a majority vote”). 
 131. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, 2015 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 19–21 (2015) (describing 
ISS’s practice of issuing withhold recommendations for unilateral board action and lack of 
responsiveness). 
 132. Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds 
Vote on Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 35 (2013). 
 133. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, supra note 131, at 21. 
 134. CHRIS CERNICH ET AL., ISS, WHEELING OUT THE PROCRUSTEAN BED: BYLAW 
RESTRICTIONS ON DISSIDENT NOMINEE COMPENSATION 1 (2013). 
2018] GOVERNANCE BY CONTRACT 393 
director nominees.135 Following ISS’s announcement, directors at Provident 
Bank, the first issuer affected by the ISS position, received a withhold vote of 
approximately 34 percent, an extremely high level of withhold votes.136 Within 
the next six months, twenty-eight of the thirty-two issuers that had adopted 
golden leash bylaws repealed them.137 Notably, the threat of shareholder voting 
pressure was sufficient to cause the issuers in question to repeal their bylaws 
without the need for litigation challenging the bylaws’ validity. 
The impact of the shareholder vote on director elections has increased with 
the advent of majority voting. Under traditional plurality voting, it was not 
possible for shareholders to fail to elect a director candidate in an uncontested 
election. Under majority voting, a director candidate must receive a majority of 
votes cast, and a large against or withhold vote can require the director to tender 
his or her resignation.138 Thus, majority voting theoretically gives real teeth to 
the shareholders’ ability to vote on director elections. 
Despite the fact that these tools exist and are increasing in importance, their 
practical effect is limited. At issuers with plurality voting, a high withhold vote 
remains symbolic and does not remove the director from the board. Even at the 
substantial number of issuers that have adopted majority voting, the number of 
directors who fail to receive a majority vote is very small and, of those, even 
fewer wind up losing their jobs.139 Nor does it appear likely, given the high costs 
involved, that shareholders would mount a proxy contest for the purpose of 
removing or replacing directors who adopt a bylaw with which shareholders 
disagree.140 
More importantly, this tactic has limited utility because it is merely 
responsive to board authority and does not truly empower shareholders to 
participate actively in governance. Although shareholders can use their voting 
power in director elections to apply pressure with respect to board-adopted 
governance provisions, the ability to apply pressure in response to unwanted 
board actions is not the equivalent of consenting to those actions. Given the 
limitations above, the lack of sufficient mobilization in response to an 
 
 135. See Martin Lipton, Bylaw Protection Against Dissident Director Conflict/Enrichment 
Schemes, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 10, 2013), 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/05/10/bylaw-protection-against-dissident-director-
conflictenrichment-schemes [https://perma.cc/7GFF-2TGA] (proposing model golden leash bylaw). 
 136. Provident Fin. Holdings, Inc., Annual Meeting Results (Form 8-K) (Nov. 26, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1010470/000093905713000530/prov8kip112613.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LTE5-5BQ9]. 
 137. Cain et al., supra note 59, at 675–76. 
 138. See generally Choi et al., supra note 11 (describing majority voting). 
 139. Id. at 1122 (reporting that, between 2007 and 2013, only eight directors failed to receive a 
majority of “for” votes at issuers with majority voting and that, of those, only three left the board 
following the election). 
 140. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 210 (2008) (noting that proxy contests are “enormously expensive”). 
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objectionable bylaw does not mean that shareholders have otherwise consented 
to its adoption. 
Finally, in some states, there is an even greater power gap between boards 
and shareholders than in Delaware. Boilermakers is premised on the fact that, 
under Delaware law, shareholder authority to amend the bylaws cannot be 
eliminated.141 Not every state corporation statute is similar. In some states, a 
corporation can be structured so that directors have exclusive authority to amend 
the bylaws. In Texas, for example, a corporation may eliminate shareholder 
authority to amend the bylaws through an appropriate provision in its charter.142 
In Maryland, a corporation can grant the power to the board, the shareholders, or 
both.143 Indeed, following the Fleming decision, the Oklahoma legislature 
amended its corporation statute to provide as a default rule that only the board of 
directors has the power to amend or repeal the corporation’s bylaws, although a 
corporation may voluntarily grant this power to the shareholders as well.144 The 
Indiana statute is similar.145 
Even in states in which corporations cannot eliminate shareholders power 
to adopt or amend the bylaws, this power may be restricted to certain types of 
governance provisions. For example, although Delaware authorizes shareholders 
to amend the bylaws to adopt majority voting,146 as of 2011, only nineteen states 
allowed shareholder-adopted majority voting bylaws without prior charter 
authorization or board approval.147 In summary, to the extent that either state law 
or firm-specific provisions limit shareholders authority to adopt, amend, and 
repeal the bylaws in whole or in part, an essential predicate of Boilermakers’ 
contractual approach is missing. 
C. Practical Limits to Shareholder Power 
In addition to legal limits on shareholder power to act through the adoption 
and amendment of the bylaws, shareholders also face practical limits on their 
power to implement changes to the bylaws. Indeed, as Strine has noted, the 
 
 141. Other courts have relied on the Boilermakers decision to apply a contractual approach to 
governance issues involving Delaware corporations. See, e.g., In re CytRx Corp. Stockholder Derivative 
Litig., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176966, *13 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2015) (“There is no question after 
Boilermakers that a forum-selection bylaw unilaterally adopted by a Delaware corporation’s board of 
directors is facially valid under Delaware contract and corporate law.”); North v. McNamara, 47 F. Supp. 
3d 635, 642 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (same). 
 142. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.057(c) (West 2015) (“A corporation’s board of directors 
may amend or repeal bylaws or adopt new bylaws unless: (1) the corporation’s certificate of formation 
or this code wholly or partly reserves the power exclusively to the corporation’s shareholders . . . .”). 
 143. MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 2-109(b) (West 2013). 
 144. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1013 (2015). 
 145. IND. CODE § 23-1-39-1 (2017) (“Unless the articles of incorporation or section 4 of this 
chapter provide otherwise, only a corporation’s board of directors may amend or repeal the corporation’s 
bylaws.”). 
 146. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2017). 
 147. Siegel, supra note 120, at 371–72. 
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“practical realities of stock market ownership have changed in ways that deprive 
most stockholders of both their right to voice and their right of exit.”148 Strine 
and Walter have termed this a “separation of ownership from ownership.”149 
Many shareholders hold their stock through institutional intermediaries such as 
pension funds and mutual funds, in which the power to vote rests in the hands of 
the institutional agent. Moreover, there are reasons to believe that institutional 
investors’ voting preferences, which dominate the voting results, differ from 
those of retail investors.150 
The standard collective action problem poses another practical limit.151 An 
extensive literature observes that because shareholders of US public companies 
are dispersed, they face costs when they seek to act collectively, and they must 
typically bear those costs personally, unlike directors.152 The rise of shareholder 
activism and the impact of intermediaries such as ISS have dramatically reduced 
these costs.153 In addition, activist hedge funds have taken on a role as 
governance intermediaries. Hedge funds can identify governance failures and 
then mobilize traditionally passive institutional investors to respond to those 
failures.154 Nonetheless, governance issues are rarely of sufficiently high value 
to attract the interest of hedge fund activists. Rather, recent work supports the 
conclusion that hedge fund activism is focused largely on other areas, such as 
sale, capital structure, and corporate strategy.155 
 
 148. Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between 
Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 370 (2015). 
 149. Id. at 340 (quoting Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? 
Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate 
Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2007)). 
 150. See Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor, 
102 MINN. L. REV. 51 (2017) (describing low voting turnout by retail investors and concern that retail 
shareholders have different voting preferences from institutional investors). 
 151. See, e.g., Kelli A. Alces, The Equity Trustee, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717, 722–35 (2010) 
(describing the collective action problem among shareholders). 
 152. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 78, at 613 (“Collective action problems preclude the 
shareholders from exercising meaningful day-to-day or even year-to-year control over managerial 
decisions.”); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247, 312 (1999) (“[S]hareholders still face collective action problems [making it] always 
extremely difficult, and often impossible, for shareholders to use their rights to vote on fundamental 
changes to oppose a transaction or policy the board favors.”); Stephen Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How To Fix 
Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 271 
(2003) (“[S]hareholder collective action is rare, even though it may benefit shareholders as a group.”). 
 153. See Cain et al., supra note 59 (using the golden leash as an example of an intermediary 
acting to reduce collective action costs); supra notes 129–133 and accompanying text (discussing proxy 
advisors). 
 154. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 862, 897 (2013) (describing 
activists as “arbitraging governance rights that become more valuable through their activity monitoring 
companies to identify strategic opportunities and then presenting them to institutional investors for their 
approval”). 
 155. C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, The Second Wave of Hedge Fund 
Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296 (2016). 
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In addition, supermajority voting requirements at specific issuers may 
heighten the collective action problem by raising the threshold required to amend 
or repeal a board-adopted bylaw.156 Delaware law allows a corporation to require 
“a supermajority vote for adopting any subsequent bylaw amendment.”157 It is 
common for corporations to adopt supermajority voting requirements for some 
or all shareholder actions.158 IPO charters increasingly contain supermajority 
provisions—88 percent of IPO charters in 2015 contained supermajority 
provisions.159 Although the incidence of these requirements has declined in S&P 
500 companies, approximately 30 percent retained a supermajority requirement 
in 2013.160 Notably, if an issuer’s charter contains a supermajority requirement, 
that requirement can only be repealed by that same supermajority.161 
 
 156. See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. 
L. REV. 1325, 1348 (2013) (“[C]harters commonly contain provisions that deter shareholders from 
amending bylaws—for instance, with supermajority vote requirements.”). 
 157. Stephen M. Gill, Kai Haakon, E. Liekefett & Leonard Wood, Structural Defenses to 
Shareholder Activism, 47 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 151, 155 (2014); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 102(b)(4) (2017) (authorizing charter provision to require the vote “of a larger portion of the stock . . . 
than is required by this chapter); Id. § 216 (authorizing corporations to specify the required vote for 
shareholder action and providing that, in the absence of a specific provision, the required threshold is 
“the majority of shares present in person or represented by proxy”). Other state statutes are similar. See, 
e.g., Scott Hirst, Frozen Charters, 34 YALE J. REG. 91, 100 (2017) (“Each state permits a corporation to 
require a greater vote requirement . . . in order to approve an amendment to important parts of the 
charter.”). 
 158. Hirst, supra note 157, at 125 n.127 (reporting that, in author’s sample of Russell 3000 
companies, “[41.9 percent had] supermajority provisions to amend one or more provisions of their 
bylaws”). 
 159. See WILMERHALE, 2016 M&A REPORT 4 (2016), 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/2016-
WilmerHale-MA-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9GM-Z54N]. The reported data included only 
Delaware corporations and included those containing supermajority requirements “to approve mergers 
or change corporate charter and bylaws.” Id. 
 160. See Gill et al., supra note 157, at 156 n.37 (noting that this number reflects a decline from 
67.62 percent in 2003). The number of issuers with supermajority requirements continues to decline, 
however, as shareholder proposals asking issuers to repeal supermajority requirements have been fairly 
common in recent years. See, e.g., Holly Gregory, Hot Topics for the 2016 Proxy Season, PRACTICAL 
LAW, Oct. 2015, at 30, 33–34, 
http://www.sidley.com/~/media/publications/oct15_governancecounselor.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H8Z-
FNL7] (identifying “elimination or reduction of supermajority vote requirements” as one of the types of 
shareholder proposals receiving the highest average level of shareholder support in 2015 and observing 
that “[e]limination of supermajority provisions to amend by-laws” was likely to “continue to be a focus 
of 2016 shareholder proposals”). 
 161. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(4) (2017) (“Whenever the certificate of incorporation shall 
require for action . . . by the holders of any class or series of shares or by the members, or by the holders 
of any other securities having voting power the vote of a greater number or proportion than is required 
by any section of this title, the provision of the certificate of incorporation requiring such greater vote 
shall not be altered, amended, or repealed except by such greater vote.”); see also Illumina Inc., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 2016 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 245 (Mar. 18, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2016/mcritchieyoung031816-14a8.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A9N7-ZZ8H] (upholding Illumina’s effort to exclude shareholder proposal seeking to 
repeal majority voting requirement on the basis that the proposal conflicted with the board’s proposal to 
retain the supermajority requirement). 
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Although shareholders can, in theory, obtain the necessary votes to adopt 
or amend a bylaw even in a corporation with a supermajority voting requirement, 
such a requirement heightens the collective action problem. As Scott Hirst has 
documented, voter turnout varies substantially among issuers.162 Many issuers 
regularly experience turnout levels that are below the supermajority 
thresholds.163 The problem of insufficient voter turnout has been exacerbated by 
the virtual elimination of discretionary voting by brokers.164 
The impact of supermajority requirements is exacerbated by the standard 
vote-counting methodology.165 According to a recent study, more than half of 
large public companies count abstentions with respect to shareholder proposals 
as “no” votes.166 Because a shareholder-initiated bylaw amendment must 
necessarily take the form of a shareholder proposal, this methodology has the 
effect of allowing issuers to treat some shareholder proposals as failing even if 
they receive a majority of votes cast.167 The study found sixty-three shareholder-
sponsored proposals between 2004 and 2014 that issuers identified as failing but 
that would have passed under a so-called “simple majority” formula.168 A 
responsive shareholder initiative has been to file resolutions seeking to have 
issuers shift to the simple majority approach that would eliminate abstentions 
from the vote count.169 
 
 162. Hirst, supra note 157. 
 163. See id. at 102 (documenting that, in Russell 3000 companies in 2013, “almost 50% of 
meetings had turnout below 80% of shares outstanding”). 
 164. Historically, according to NYSE and Nasdaq rules, brokers were able to exercise voting 
power for shares they held as custodians if the beneficial owners did not submit voting instructions. 
Changes to those rules have greatly reduced that power and resulted in an increased number of shares 
not being voted. See Fisch, supra note 150, at 26–27 (describing amendments to NYSE and Nasdaq 
rules reducing the scope of issues on which brokers can exercise discretionary voting authority with 
respect to uninstructed shares). 
 165. This methodology may not be consistent with the applicable statutes in all states. See, e.g., 
Abbott Labs., SEC No-Action Letter, 2016 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 79, at *10–20 (Jan. 29, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2016/kennethsteinerabbott012916-14a8.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2G4H-3VSL] (SEC inquiry from Abbott Labs., Inc., arguing that a simple majority 
approach was invalid under Ill. Bus. Corp. Act Section 7.60, which provides that shareholder action 
requires the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares represented at the meeting and entitled to vote 
on a matter). The language of the Delaware statute is similar to that of the Illinois statute. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 216(2) (2017) (“In all matters other than the election of directors, the affirmative vote of 
the majority of shares present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on 
the subject matter shall be the act of the stockholders.”). 
 166. See INVESTOR VOICE, SIMPLE-MAJORITY STANDARD FOR USE IN CORPORATE PROXIES 
(2015), http://www.investorvoice.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Vote-Counting_Synopsis_Version-
9e_2015.0315.pdf [https://perma.cc/AUS8-34FR] (describing simple majority formula). 
 167. Bruce Herbert, Simple Majority Vote Counting Initiative for Proxies, CORP. GOVERNANCE 
(Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.corpgov.net/2015/03/simple-majority-vote-counting-initiative-for-proxies 
[https://perma.cc/ZCR2-VH4D]. 
 168. INVESTOR VOICE, supra note 166, at 2. 
 169. Gregory J. Millman, Why Shareholder Proposals Win More Votes, Lose Anyway, WALL ST. 
J. (Mar. 20, 2015, 10:32 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/03/20/why-shareholder-
proposals-win-more-votes-lose-anyway/?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_riskcompliance 
[https://perma.cc/92YB-YTMZ]. To date these proposals have received limited shareholder support. 
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A final practical impediment to shareholder power is the SEC’s 
gatekeeping role. Shareholder resolutions seeking to amend the bylaws are 
typically, albeit not inevitably, presented to the issuer in the form of Rule 14a-8 
shareholder proposals.170 It is commonplace for issuers to seek SEC approval to 
exclude from the proxy statement shareholder proposals that they do not 
support.171 One basis for excluding a shareholder proposal is if that proposal, if 
implemented, would cause the issuer to violate state law.172 This leaves the SEC 
staff in the awkward position of attempting to determine the scope of shareholder 
bylaw authority despite the fact that, as noted above in Part II.A, Delaware law 
is somewhat unclear on the issue.173 
Delaware amended its constitution in 2007 to permit the SEC to certify 
questions regarding Delaware corporate law to the state supreme court.174 
Although the SEC used the certification procedure in AFSCME,175 it is not 
required to do so, and the Delaware Supreme Court is not required to accept the 
SEC’s request for a ruling.176 As a result, the SEC staff is repeatedly called upon 
to determine whether a shareholder-proposed bylaw is permissible, with only the 
submissions of the proponent and the issuer to guide it in making that 
 
See, e.g., Shirley Westcott, 2016 Proxy Season Review, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (Aug. 11, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/08/11/2016-proxy-season-review-2 
[https://perma.cc/QP2X-7V27] (“[T]he eight resolutions that came to a vote averaged only single-digit 
(7.9%) support.”). 
 170. See Donna Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action 
Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 938 (1998) 
(discussing no-action letters relating to shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8). A shareholder may 
mount an independent proxy solicitation seeking to amend the bylaws, but, given the costs of such a 
solicitation, shareholders are unlikely to do so outside of the control context. Cf. Airgas, Inc. v. Air 
Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1187 (Del. 2010) (describing Air Product’s proposal of three bylaw 
amendments in conjunction with a proxy contest “[a]s part of its takeover strategy”). 
 171. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j) (2017) (designating required procedures for issuer seeking to 
exclude a shareholder proposal); see Alan Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed 
Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 886–92 (1994) (explaining the no-action 
process). 
 172. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j)(2) (2017). 
 173. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Bylaw Barricades: Unions and Shareholder Rights, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 
1997, at 31 (observing that, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund v. Fleming 
Companies, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2980 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 24, 1997), “the district court read SEC Rule 
14a-8 very differently than the SEC has read that rule on shareholder proposals in recent years and 
determined that a mandatory bylaw amendment was a proper subject under state law”). 
 174. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8), amended by 76 Del. Laws 2007, ch. 37, § 1 (effective May 3, 
2007). 
 175. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 229 n.1 (Del. 2008)); see also 
No-Action Request, supra note 69, at 3 (arguing that a proxy reimbursement proposal should be 
excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(2)). 
 176. See, e.g., Junis L. Baldon, Note, Taking a Backseat: How Delaware Can Alter the Role of 
the SEC in Evaluating Shareholder Proposals, 4 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 101, 121–22 (2009) (“The 
opportunity still exists for the SEC to go astray and continue to issue pronouncement [sic] of state law 
with minimal state guidance.”). 
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determination.177 Although a full analysis of the staff’s approach to this question 
is beyond the scope of this Article,178 it is clear that the procedure has the 
practical effect of preventing many proposed bylaws from being presented to the 
shareholders.179 
III. 
SOLUTIONS TO RENDER THE CONTRACTUAL MODEL MORE WORKABLE 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the shareholder power to act 
through the adoption, amendment, and repeal of the bylaws is, for a variety of 
reasons, less expansive than board power. As a result, the level of judicial 
deference reflected in Boilermakers and ATP—deference that is based on the 
contractual theory—may be inappropriate. In particular, board-adopted 
governance provisions may not merit limited oversight because their adoption 
does not adhere to contractual principles, as discussed above. If shareholders lack 
the power to block or overturn provisions with which they disagree, the courts 
should not presume that shareholders have consented to these provisions. 
Two alternative solutions are possible. One approach is to remediate the 
failure of existing law to conform with the contractual metaphor by increasing 
shareholder power. If shareholder authority to adopt, amend, and repeal 
corporate bylaws were commensurate with board authority, the corporate bylaws 
would more closely resemble the theoretical contract envisioned in 
Boilermakers. Shareholder empowerment, however, raises normative concerns 
and creates tension with the board-centric model of Delaware corporate law. 
 
 177. An issuer seeking exclusion under this provision is required to submit a supporting opinion 
from counsel. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j)(2)(iii) (2017). 
 178. For a more detailed analysis and an argument that the SEC should adopt a policy of refusing 
to exclude shareholder proposals on the basis that they violate state law, see Christopher Bruner, 
Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 1, 43 (2011). 
 179. The Wall Street Journal reported that, during the 2017 proxy season, issuers submitted 288 
requests to exclude a shareholder proposal, and the SEC staff granted 78 percent of such requests. 
Tatyana Shumsky, SEC Lets More Companies Ignore Shareholder Proposals in 2017, WALL ST. J. (July 
7, 2017) https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-lets-more-companies-ignore-shareholder-proposals-in-
2017-1499447145 [https://perma.cc/E8DQ-4PUR]. See, e.g., Scott’s Liquid Gold-Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2013 SEC No-Act LEXIS 383, at *1, 4 (May 7, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-
noaction/14a-8/2013/michaeldeutschrecon050713-14a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6LY-5MFT] (allowing 
exclusion of a proposal on the basis that it impermissibly limited the board’s authority by mandating 
specified disclosures); Pfizer Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 SEC No-Act LEXIS 161, at *1 (Feb. 
22, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/donaldvuchetich022212-
14a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9RY-C6WN] (allowing exclusion of proposed dispute resolution bylaw); 
Vail Resorts, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 SEC No-Act LEXIS 492, at *1 (Sep. 16, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2011/jeffreydoppel091611-14a8.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5QTY-KXT4] (approving exclusion of stockholder proposal to amend the bylaws to 
“make distributions to stockholders a higher priority than debt repayment or asset acquisition”); 
Monsanto Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act LEXIS 746 (Nov. 7, 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2008/harringtoninvestments121808-14a8.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TQ6Y-G4D9] (concurring with exclusion of stockholder proposal to amend the 
bylaws to require directors to take an oath of allegiance to the U.S. Constitution). 
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Accordingly, an alternative approach would be for courts to recognize the limits 
of the contract analogy and to scrutinize board-adopted bylaws more closely. 
This Article draws upon the Delaware Supreme Court’s Unocal decision180 to 
develop a framework for enhanced judicial scrutiny of such bylaws. 
A. Invigorating the Corporate Contract Through Increased Shareholder 
Empowerment 
Strine is undoubtedly correct in observing that the courts have little reason 
to interfere with governance terms that are freely adopted by the corporation’s 
participants. Private ordering is consistent with Delaware’s enabling approach to 
corporate law, as well as the widely held expectation that market discipline will 
lead issuers to adopt governance terms that are value-enhancing.181 Private 
ordering offers market participants the opportunity to overcome informational 
issues that limit regulators’ ability to identify optimal governance structures. It 
also offers firms individualized tailoring that enables them to vary their 
governance structures to reflect firm-specific characteristics.182 The problem 
with private ordering under Delaware corporate law is that the board’s control 
over governance terms is far greater than that of the shareholders, and the board, 
acting alone, may fail to select optimal governance structures for a variety of 
reasons.183 
One possible solution is to modify Delaware law to level the playing field, 
granting shareholders greater authority to engage in private ordering. The 
Delaware legislature could choose to do so by reducing or eliminating the 
limitations on shareholder power to adopt and amend the bylaws described in 
this Article. It could, for example, amend the corporate statute, either broadly to 
endorse shareholder power or more narrowly to remove specific existing 
obstacles to the exercise of that power. Taking the broad approach, the legislature 
could reconcile the existing tension between sections 109 and 141(a) by 
providing that, notwithstanding section 141(a), shareholders have the power to 
adopt any bylaw, substantive or procedural, relating to the business and affairs 
 
 180. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 181. See, e.g., Barry Baysinger & Henry Butler, Race for the Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The 
ALI Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J. CORP. L. 431, 446–49 (1985) (characterizing this 
position as that of the “corporate federalists”). 
 182. See Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner Gallagher Discusses Federal Preemption of State 
Corporate Governance, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 7, 2014) 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/04/07/commissioner-gallagher-discusses-federal-preemption-
of-state-corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/FE9Y-3YVG] (describing the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
federalization of corporate governance as a “one-size-fits-none model”); see also David F. Larcker & 
Allan L. Mccall, Proxy Advisers Don’t Help Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8 2013, 6:51 PM) 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/proxy-advisers-don8217t-help-shareholdersproxy-advisers-don8217t-
help-shareholders-1386530835 [https://perma.cc/7S28-JME6] (terming proxy advisor’s one-size-fits-
all governance practices “best guesses”). 
 183. See Michal Barzuza, Do Heterogeneous Firms Select Their Right “Size” of Corporate 
Governance Arrangements? (Va. L. & Econ. Research Working Paper No. 16, 2016) (arguing that 
agency problems interfere with firms’ selection of efficient governance provisions). 
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of the corporation.184 Such a provision would make clear that both parties to the 
corporate contract—the shareholders and the board—have equal power to 
choose the contract terms. Alternatively, the legislature could amend the 
corporation statute to mirror the LLC and limited partnership statutes, which 
explicitly give maximum effect to freedom of contract. A more tailored approach 
could address the relative authority of the board and the shareholders with 
respect to a particular bylaw about which they disagree. For example, the 
legislature might amend the statute to provide explicit authority for the 
shareholders to amend or repeal a board-adopted bylaw by simple majority vote. 
Similarly, the statute could follow the Model Business Corporations Act 
approach discussed above and preclude the board from amending or repealing a 
shareholder-adopted bylaw. 
Statutory changes such as those outlined above would add useful clarity to 
the issue of shareholders’ bylaw power, but legislative action is not necessary. 
The Delaware courts created the existing tension between sections 109 and 
141(a), and they have the power to reread the statute to eliminate that tension. 
The Delaware courts are famous for their incremental and context-specific 
approach to corporate law,185 and for their sensitivity to market and institutional 
developments that warrant a reconsideration of their prior precedents.186 As 
noted above, the AFSCME decision’s narrow approach to shareholder bylaw 
power might be ripe for such reconsideration considering recent developments 
in the exercise of shareholder power. Investor activism has increased, including 
the growing use by institutional investors of shareholder proposals to introduce 
bylaw amendments relating to governance structures. Such amendments include 
the implementation of majority voting and proxy access. These changes should 
prompt the court to reconsider shareholder power to adopt and amend bylaws.187 
The question of whether to increase shareholder power in this way to 
support a contractual approach to evaluating the validity of corporate bylaws 
raises important normative considerations, however. In particular, whether 
 
 184. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234 (Del. 2008) (noting that 
the existing statutory language is “only marginally helpful in determining what the Delaware legislature 
intended to be the lawful scope of the shareholders’ power to adopt, amend and repeal bylaws”). 
 185. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1079 (2000) (noting the Delaware courts’ willingness to 
reconsider their prior precedents rather than adhering to strong principles of stare decisis). 
 186. See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015); In re Trulia, Inc. 
Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016); see also Fisch, supra note 185, at 1079. 
 187. Although the Delaware courts rarely overrule corporate law precedents directly, the case 
law reflects a variety of areas in which the courts have announced a new approach that reflects a 
substantial departure from that taken in previous cases. See, e.g., Corwin, 125 A.3d at 311 (imposing 
limits on the scope of the court’s prior decisions in Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009), 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) 
(clarifying that the “obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that 
stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty,” despite the court’s prior articulation of a 
duty of good faith in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)). 
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Delaware law should be modified to increase shareholder power is controversial. 
On the one hand, greater shareholder power can enable shareholders to monitor 
management more effectively. Some commentators further view shareholder 
power as an inherent right of stock ownership. For example, Lucian Bebchuk 
proposed that corporate law grant shareholders the authority to “initiate and 
adopt any rules-of-the-game decisions.”188 Bebchuk would go so far as to enable 
shareholders to initiate charter amendments and reincorporation decisions.189 His 
view, consistent with the analysis in the preceding Part of this Article, is that 
existing law precludes shareholders from adopting value-increasing governance 
arrangements that management disfavors.190 
Similarly, Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, and Marcus Kai Hintze have 
broadly defended the value of private ordering and argued in favor of changes to 
the Delaware statute, case law, and Rule 14a-8 that would “enhance the ability 
of shareholders in public corporations to contract with shareholder bylaws.”191 
Brett McDonnell observed that expansive shareholder bylaw power can be 
justified by the fact that the bylaws are the main source for shareholder initiatives 
to shape corporate governance without board approval.192 Accordingly, he 
proposed four statutory changes designed to increase shareholder power.193 
However, there are reasons to be cautious about this response. Although 
shareholder empowerment may provide benefits to the corporation, it also has 
its costs. Bill Bratton and Michael Wachter articulated one of the more powerful 
positions against shareholder empowerment, arguing that it is likely to cause 
managers to manage to the market—problematic because it creates an incentive 
for excessive risk-taking.194 Greater shareholder empowerment is also in tension 
with the board-centric model of the corporation.195 Stephen Bainbridge 
challenged Bebchuk’s argument for greater shareholder power by identifying a 
variety of efficiency benefits that result from the separation of ownership and 
control.196 Commentators have also warned that shareholder empowerment 
 
 188. Bebchuk, supra note 23, at 865; see also id. at 871 (proposing to “empower shareholders in 
public corporations by facilitating their ability to contract”). 
 189. Id. at 913. 
 190. Id. at 845–46. 
 191. Smith et al., supra note 31, at 188. 
 192. McDonnell, supra note 91, at 656. 
 193. Id. at 665. McDonnell’s suggestions included codifying the substance/procedure distinction, 
providing that shareholder-adopted bylaws may limit board discretion, explicitly authorizing 
shareholders to adopt bylaws dealing with poison pills, and providing that the board cannot amend a 
shareholder bylaw. Id. 
 194. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 23, at 657–61. 
 195. Stephen Bainbridge is best known for arguing that shareholders’ interests are best served by 
empowering the board of directors as a strong central authority, a model he termed “Director Primacy.” 
Bainbridge, supra note 78, at 557–59. 
 196. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response to Increasing Shareholder Power: Director Primacy and 
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (2006). Board primacy can also be 
justified for a number of pragmatic reasons. For example, as Jeff Gordon has observed, increased 
shareholder power may be misused due to the “risks of pathologies in shareholder voting and because 
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creates a risk of self-dealing or interest group behavior because shareholders, 
unlike directors, do not usually owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and their 
fellow shareholders.197 Finally, to the extent that contractual freedom is value-
enhancing, business participants can obtain that freedom by selecting alternative 
business forms such as the LLC. By retaining the managerial approach in 
corporate law, Delaware thus offers businesses a range of structural options. 
The preceding arguments offer reasons to be cautious about embracing 
shareholder empowerment in order to justify application of the contractual 
approach. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to assess the relative 
costs and benefits of increased shareholder empowerment, Delaware need not 
level the contractual playing field. The courts could instead reduce their reliance 
on the contractual model and impose greater scrutiny on board-adopted bylaws. 
The next Section considers that alternative. 
B. The Alternative: Increased Judicial Oversight 
Because leveling the playing field with respect to corporate bylaws would 
increase shareholder empowerment, those favoring director primacy are likely to 
reject that approach. If Delaware law continues to limit the scope of shareholder 
bylaw authority, the alternative is for courts to engage in greater judicial 
oversight of board-adopted governance terms. 
Increased judicial oversight of board-adopted governance bylaws could be 
workable. Indeed, existing case law offers a model that could readily be extended 
to the New Governance: the analytical approach developed in the Unocal case.198 
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court announced a new framework requiring 
courts to apply enhanced scrutiny when reviewing board-adopted antitakeover 
devices. The test involves a two-part inquiry encompassing both reasonableness 
and proportionality.199 First, the “directors must show that they had reasonable 
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness exist[s] 
 
of the chance that shareholders could use such initiative power to extract private gains.” Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay 
for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 547 (1997). 
 197. See, e.g., Frederick H. Alexander & James D. Honaker, Power to the Franchise or the 
Fiduciaries?: An Analysis of the Limits on Stockholder Activist Bylaws, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 749, 755 
(2008) (“[S]tockholders cannot use their statutory power to adopt bylaws to make management 
decisions: because stockholders do not owe fiduciary duties to the other stockholders.”); Iman Anabtawi, 
Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 564 (2006) 
(“[S]hareholders . . . may use any incremental power conferred upon them to pursue those interests to 
the detriment of shareholders as a class.”). 
 198. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
 199. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1374 (Del. 1995) (describing “Unocal’s 
reasonableness and proportionality review”). 
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. . . .”200 Second, the board’s response must be “reasonable in relation to the threat 
posed.”201 
The same enhanced scrutiny, which might be understood as an 
intermediate-level review, can be applied to the board’s unilateral adoption202 of 
a governance provision that materially diminishes shareholder rights.203 First, the 
court would consider whether the board reasonably believed that the provision 
was necessary to address a threat to the corporation. Second, the court would 
determine whether the provision was a proportional response to that threat. If the 
governance provision meets these standards, the court would uphold its adoption. 
In evaluating the nature of the threat, the courts should consider the subject 
matter of the bylaw with two principles in mind. First, in keeping with the 
rationale for director primacy, the courts should more readily accept actions 
designed to protect the board’s discretion with respect to decisions that are “so 
fundamental to management’s ability to run a company on a day-to-day basis 
that they could not, as a practical matter, be subject to direct shareholder 
oversight.”204 The case for shareholder authority is less compelling with respect 
to management’s basic business choices.205 Second, the courts should be mindful 
that the right of shareholders to elect directors freely is a fundamental basis for 
the legitimacy of director primacy.206 Accordingly, bylaws that materially 
interfere with that election power require greater justification. 
A few examples demonstrate the application of this intermediate-level 
scrutiny to common types of board-adopted bylaws and illustrate how this 
 
 200. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
 201. Id. The Unocal court identified a third factor that “the directors may not have acted solely 
or primarily out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in office.” Id. This factor has played a more limited 
role in subsequent analysis of Unocal. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 
1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) (concluding that the third factor was satisfied where “[t]he Newmont board acted 
to maintain the company’s independence and not merely to preserve its own control”). 
 202. The approach advocated by this Article applies specifically to unilateral board action. This 
Article does not take a position on whether this level of judicial oversight is necessary or appropriate for 
provisions that are subject to shareholder approval, such as a charter amendment or shareholder-ratified 
bylaw. 
 203. This language is taken from the policy positions of the proxy advisory firms, ISS and Glass 
Lewis, which have adopted such a standard in deciding whether to recommend against the election of a 
director candidate. See WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, HEADS UP FOR THE 2016 PROXY SEASON: ISS 
AND GLASS LEWIS UPDATE THEIR VOTING POLICIES (2015), 
https://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/revised-pcag-alert--112315.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NHW-
LYA9]; Ellen Odoner & Lyuba Goltser, ISS and Glass Lewis Updated 2016 Voting Policies, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Dec. 2, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/02/iss-
and-glass-lewis-updated-2016-voting-policies [https://perma.cc/ZJZ9-4LSS] (describing updates to ISS 
and Glass Lewis policies). 
 204. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, SEC Release No. 23200, 1998 WL 
254809, at *4 (May 21, 1998). 
 205. Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 348 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding that 
management, rather than shareholders, are best positioned to determine which products to sell—a basic 
business choice). 
 206. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The shareholder 
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”). 
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approach focuses on existing power dynamics more effectively than contractual 
analysis. The first example is forum selection bylaws such as the bylaw at issue 
in the Boilermakers case. Boards have adopted forum selection bylaws in 
response to the growth of shareholder litigation, particularly M&A litigation.207 
Forum selection bylaws seek to limit the need for a corporation to defend itself 
against lawsuits in multiple courts based on a single transaction.208 
Because the vast majority of forum selection bylaws are adopted 
unilaterally and not subjected to a shareholder vote,209 intermediate-level review 
should apply. Courts should analyze a board’s adoption of a forum selection 
bylaw under a Unocal-type approach as follows. First, the increase in M&A 
litigation generally and multi-forum litigation in particular should qualify as a 
sufficient threat to corporate value. Commentators have noted the costs of 
defending against litigation in multiple forums as well as the risk of conflicting 
judgments and reverse auctions by plaintiffs’ counsel.210 In addition, boards 
manage litigation and litigation risk as a core function of their duties.211 Second, 
Delaware courts should treat adoption of a forum selection bylaw as a 
proportionate response to the threat. Such bylaws address the problems 
associated with multi-forum litigation without drastically reducing shareholders’ 
litigation rights. 
Fee-shifting bylaws might be analyzed differently. Although the problem 
of meritless litigation closely tracks the concern over multi-forum litigation, a 
board’s determination that shareholders too frequently file suits that do not 
discipline corporate management or vindicate shareholder rights is more 
questionable.212 Nonetheless, the frequency with which mergers are challenged 
through litigation coupled with the infrequency with which this litigation results 
 
 207. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State 
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465 (2015) (detailing the rise in merger litigation); Fisch, 
supra note 10 (describing litigation bylaws as a response to that rise). 
 208. Joseph Grundfest was one of the first to suggest this approach. See Joseph Grundfest, Choice 
of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate Litigation: Mandatory and Elective Approaches (Stanford 
Univ. Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance Working Paper, Paper No. 91, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1690561. 
 209. See Romano & Sanga, supra note 56, at 27, 31 (reporting that, in the sample studied, “[o]nly 
12 percent of midstream adoptions were put to a shareholder vote”). 
 210. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES: THE 
REAL COSTS OF U.S. SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 1, 3 (2014), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/EconomicConsequences_Web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BKG7-YCV8] (describing the costs of shareholder suits). 
 211. See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative 
Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. LAW. 503, 522 (1989) 
(observing that “no principled distinction can be drawn between a board’s decisions relating to corporate 
litigation generally and those relating to other business matters”). 
 212. This is especially true because a substantial percentage of shareholder litigation involves 
challenges to director conduct or oversight. See, e.g., Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Litigation 
Discovery and Corporate Governance: The Missing Story about the “Genius of American Corporate 
Law,” 63 EMORY L.J. 1383, 1395 (2014) (arguing that the information revealed through discovery in 
shareholder litigation “disciplines management”). 
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in a monetary recovery for the plaintiff class has led many to conclude that a 
substantial percentage of lawsuits are without merit.213 A reviewing court could 
therefore conclude that the potential for excessive and frivolous litigation 
constitutes a threat. 
Whether a fee-shifting bylaw such as that seen in ATP represents a 
reasonable response to that threat is, however, doubtful. As critics have observed, 
the specific bylaw in ATP would likely discourage both “good” and “bad” 
lawsuits from being brought.214 On the other hand, fee-shifting bylaws need not 
be as broad as the bylaw adopted by the ATP board. Rather, a board could 
narrowly tailor a fee-shifting bylaw so that it discouraged frivolous litigation 
while allowing meritorious suits to proceed.215 More rigorous judicial scrutiny 
would thus bring a more nuanced approach to the validity of fee-shifting bylaws 
than either the broad acceptance of the ATP decision or the Delaware 
legislature’s subsequent rejection of all charter and bylaw provisions that impose 
liability on a shareholder in connection with the litigation of an internal corporate 
claim.216 
A third example is advance notice bylaws, which require shareholders to 
provide the issuer with advance notice of their intent to nominate a director 
candidate, and to disclose various pieces of information relating to that 
nomination. Advance notice bylaws are almost ubiquitous among public 
issuers.217 The Delaware courts have observed that “[a]dvance notice 
requirements are ‘commonplace’ and ‘are often construed and frequently upheld 
as valid by Delaware courts.’”218 The scope of advance notice bylaws varies 
tremendously, however, both with respect to the amount of advance notice 
 
 213. See Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn 
Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
557, 559–560 (2015) (summarizing this debate); DEL. STATE BAR COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF 
COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 3 (2015) 
http://www.corporatedefensedisputes.com/files/2015/03/COUNCIL-SECOND-PROPOSAL-
EXPLANATORY-PAPER-3-6-15-U0124513.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2N4-5K8F] (observing that 
“[s]ome officers and directors and their advocates assert, on the other hand, that stockholder litigation 
causes corporations expense without producing commensurate benefits”). 
 214. See., e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation 
by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 30 (2015) (terming such a bylaw “extreme” because 
it “[takes] no account of the merits of the underlying claim”); DEL. STATE BAR COUNCIL, supra note 
213, at 3, 6 (arguing that fee-shifting bylaws like the one in ATP would make shareholder litigation 
“untenable” and “eliminate the only extant regulation of substantive corporate law”). 
 215. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi, Fee-Shifting and Shareholder Litigation (Va. Law & Econ. 
Research Working Paper No. 15, 2016) (developing a model for optimal fee-shifting bylaws, including 
heightened judicial oversight). 
 216. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2016). 
 217. See Romano & Sanga, supra note 56. 
 218. Goggin v. Vermillion, Inc., No. 6465-VCN, 2011 WL 2347704, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 3, 
2011) (quoting Openwave Sys., Inc. v. Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd., 924 A.2d 228, 
238–39 (Del. Ch. 2007)). 
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required and the extent of mandated disclosure.219 Commentators have 
characterized the courts’ approach to advance notice bylaws as “[j]udicial 
[s]chizophrenia.”220 In particular, the effort to determine when the requirements 
of a specific bylaw excessively burden shareholders’ voting rights appears 
somewhat unprincipled.221 
The test proposed in this Article would add clarity. Issuers defend advance 
notice bylaws on the basis that they allow shareholders sufficient time and 
information to vote intelligently.222 A bylaw providing a notice period and 
required information that is reasonably related to these objectives should survive 
judicial scrutiny.223 To the extent that an advance notice bylaw has the effect of 
precluding shareholders from exercising their voting rights, however, this test 
would provide the court with a basis for invalidating it as disproportionate to 
those goals.224 
A similar intermediate-level scrutiny could be applied to other board-
adopted bylaws that limit the effectiveness of shareholders’ voting rights. This 
analysis would clarify the scope of the board’s authority.225 For example, in the 
recent Frechter v. Zier decision, the board adopted a bylaw requiring a two-thirds 
shareholder vote to remove a director.226 The court held that the bylaw was 
invalid because it conflicted with section 141(k).227 The decision is in tension, 
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 223. See id. at 40–43 (concluding that the specific bylaw at issue was a reasonable response to 
the identified concerns); In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 482 (Del. Ch. 
2000) (stating that a sixty-day advance notice bylaw “merely lengthens the electoral contest in a way 
that appears to strike a reasonable balance between the electorate’s need to hear out all participants in 
the debate and the acquiror’s need for an adequate opportunity to line up a slate before the meeting”). 
But see Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 319 (Del. Ch. 2000) (applying the “compelling 
justification” standard to strike down a board-adopted supermajority bylaw, where the board’s “primary 
purpose” was to impair stockholders). 
 224. See., e.g., Fisch, supra note 10, at 1655–56 (describing bylaws adopted by Allergan board 
as unduly restrictive of shareholder voting rights). 
 225. See, e.g., J.W. Verret, Defending Against Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware’s Future 
Reviewing Company Defenses in the Era of Dodd-Frank, 36 J. CORP. LAW 391, 404–06 (2011) 
(discussing potential board adoption of director qualification bylaws or bylaws that limit the powers of 
dissident-nominated directors to defend shareholders’ rights). 
 226. Frechter v. Zier, No. 12038-VCG, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 214 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2017). 
 227. As the court noted, section 141(k) is subject to two exceptions—for corporations that have 
classified boards and those that have cumulative voting. Id. at *5 n.20. Neither exception was applicable 
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however, with section 216, which seems explicitly to authorize supermajority 
bylaws,228 as well as earlier cases that have not viewed such bylaws as invalid.229 
Rather than relying on the statute, the court’s analysis could have focused on the 
board’s rationale for the bylaw and the extent to which a supermajority 
requirement, in the context of the specific corporation, materially limited 
shareholders’ voting rights. The court should have recognized that a 
supermajority requirement does not, by itself, prevent shareholders from 
achieving their desired outcome. 
Finally, the same rationale can be applied to provide a more principled 
analysis of the shareholder-adopted bylaw in AFSCME. Because of the critical 
importance of the shareholders’ right to elect directors, in addition to subjecting 
board efforts to interfere with that right to careful scrutiny, courts should view 
shareholder power to adopt bylaws that focus on the election and structure of the 
board more expansively. The touchstone for the validity of such bylaws should 
be the subject matter—the election process—rather than whether the bylaws are 
properly characterized as substantive or procedural. 
This approach appears to be consistent with legislative intent as reflected 
in the Delaware statutory amendment subsequent to the AFSCME decision, 
which explicitly authorized shareholders to adopt bylaws implementing proxy 
access230 and authorized reimbursement of proxy contest expenses.231 The same 
principle should be applied to similar shareholder-adopted bylaws that address 
the power of the shareholders to nominate, elect, and remove members of the 
board, rather than requiring explicit statutory authorization for each. Notably, 
however, the analysis suggested in this Part does not interfere with the 
fundamental role of the board in overseeing the operation of the corporation and 
is therefore less intrusive than the shareholder empowerment approach discussed 
in the preceding Section of this Part. 
CONCLUSION 
The contractual approach to corporate law—which has been widely 
defended in legal scholarship for more than twenty-five years—has received 
 
in Frechter. The court further noted that its decision was limited to the validity of a supermajority bylaw, 
observing that section 102(b)(4) of the statute provides that a certificate of incorporation may require 
“for any corporate action . . . a larger portion of the stock . . . than is required by this chapter.” Id. at *5 
n.19 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(4) (2017)). 
 228. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2017) (“Subject to this chapter in respect of the vote that 
shall be required for a specified action, the certificate of incorporation or bylaws of any corporation 
authorized to issue stock may specify . . . the votes that shall be necessary for, the transaction of any 
business . . . .”). 
 229. See, e.g., Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000) (rejecting board-
adopted supermajority bylaw based on the board’s purpose for adopting it). 
 230. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2017). 
 231. Id. § 113 (2017). 
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strong judicial support in two recent Delaware decisions.232 The courts’ 
expansive endorsement of freedom of contract in these cases opens the door to 
broad-based experimentation and implementation of New Governance 
provisions tailored to issuer-specific needs. The Delaware courts have explicitly 
relied on contractual principles to justify broad deference to this 
experimentation. 
At the same time, these decisions may stretch the contract analogy too far. 
In particular, several aspects of existing law limit the ability of shareholders to 
participate on an equal footing with boards in the private ordering process. This 
asymmetry undermines the justification for the broad judicial deference. In the 
absence of true shareholder power to limit the board’s adoption of unwanted 
governance provisions, the courts’ characterization of New Governance 
provisions in terms of contract is overstated. 
One possible solution is for the courts or the legislature to overturn existing 
limits on shareholder power so as to warrant reliance on the contractual analogy. 
Although this approach may be desirable, increased shareholder empowerment 
raises a number of potential concerns. Courts could instead rethink the existing 
level of deference given to board-adopted governance provisions and subject 
those provisions to greater judicial scrutiny. Intermediate-level scrutiny would 
allow courts to play a meaningful role in preventing boards from adopting 
bylaws that excessively interfere with shareholder rights. The need for courts to 
exercise such scrutiny responds to the reality that the corporation is not truly a 
contract, and shareholders, due to existing legal and practical obstacles, cannot 
protect themselves effectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 232. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014); Boilermakers Local 
154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
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